Political Rebuilding
Statehood
Somaliland’s failure to secure de jure recognition as a state has not prevented its de facto acceptance as a polity. The administration has established low-key bilateral relations with Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen, and has maintained informal links with IGAD, the OAU and the United Nations. Ethiopia, Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Italy, France and the United States have all welcomed official delegations from the government. The United Nations, European Commission, and other international organizations working in Somaliland territory deal with the leadership as responsible authorities. International reluctance to accept Somaliland’s claims to sovereignty has denied the government access to bilateral and multilateral financial instruments, and has discouraged certain types of foreign direct investment. Lack of international acceptance has also denied recognition to Somaliland travel documents (while Somali travel documents are no longer considered valid in most countries of the world) and to the Somaliland shilling (which has protected Somaliland from the dumping of freely printed Somali Shillings in Muqdisho and elsewhere). It has also prevented Somaliland’s leadership from playing a constructive role in the affairs of other Somalis, ascribing them the role of political faction in any peace process, rather than that of a third party. But international indifference has had one inadvertently beneficial side effect: it has permitted Somaliland to resolve its internal problems and to develop its own institutions without developing a dependence on foreign assistance or incurring foreign debt.
The continued development of its institutions, administration, and policies remains both an internal priority, and an important manifestation of its statehood. Even before Somaliland is recognized by other state actors; it will be expected to demonstrate its capacity to act as a fully-fledged member of the international community.
“Top-Down” versus “Bottom-Up” State-Building
Somaliland has become a commonly cited example in support of “bottom-up” development. The “synergy” that existed between local polities and national political reconciliation proved so successful in Somaliland, may have looked to it as a model for resolving other conflicts. Somaliland’s hybrid system of tri-party democracy and traditional clan-based governance has enabled the consolidation of state-like authority, social and economic recovery and, above all, relative peace and security but now needs reform. Success has brought greater resources, including a special funding status with donors – especially the UK, Denmark and the European Union (EU) – as well as investment from and diplomatic ties with Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), though not international recognition. It is increasingly part of the regional system; ties are especially strong with Ethiopia and Djibouti. Its “hybrid” system – a modern state superstructure, led by democratically-elected politicians, grafted onto a traditional clan-based internal government. Certainly peace is costly to maintain, with 52 per cent (in 2013) of the national budget spent on the security sector and social services dependent on foreign aid. The Guurti is the primary institution through which small and minority clans feel represented, Somaliland’s achievements deserve recognition and practical aid, but with success have come strains, and its political and social compact needs urgent renewal. The “hybrid” state has been a successful transitional vehicle but must now be reconfigured to meet longer-term needs for stability, political inclusion, rule of law and development.
For over twenty-eight years, Somaliland has acted as an independent state from Somalia. Somaliland has established two branches of parliament, an executive, judiciary, ministries, police, and military services; and, has held both regional and national elections for parliamentarians and presidents (Bradbury, 2008).
Brief Overview of Somaliland History and People
Similar in geographic size to the American state of Florida, Somaliland is located on the strategic Horn of East Africa just north of Somalia. It’s on the eastern border of Ethiopia and to the south of the Gulf of Aden. Its official language is Somali, though English is increasingly spoken among its educated population. Despite regional clan differences, the overwhelming majority of Somaliland’s population has Cushitic ethnic origins, and is united by Sunni Islam with its adherence to Sharia Islamic law. Although the ethnic composition of Somaliland is almost entirely indigenous Somali people, the population stretches across several patrilineal clans, including the Isaaq, the largest in Somaliland, and the Gadabuursi, Ciise, Dhulbahante, and Warsangeli clans, all of which have fiercely defended their regional territories and interests over the centuries. Somaliland is moving away from its long tradition of a hierarchical society of competing clans that were often susceptible to political disharmony. The country is moving towards a more representative – one man one vote system – dominated by national political parties that cut across clan and regional loyalties. The eastern part of Somaliland consists of a hot, arid coastal salt plain that receives less than four inches of rain annually. Due to its location off of the Indian Ocean, it has remained quite susceptible to the monsoon season in the wetter spring and the contrasting drought devastation that occurs every few years during the summer. With limited precipitation, nomadic pastoralism dominates the central and northern part of Somaliland, with agricultural farming predominant on the southern plateau and foothills where rainfall more regularly averages 20 to 30 inches per year. The capital of Somaliland is Hargeisa, with a population of approximately 1.8 million. Other major cities include Burco in the country’s center, Berbera, the country’s main oceanic port, the university town of Boorame, and the cities of Gabiley, Ceerigaabo, and Laas Cannood. With a population between 3.9 million and 4 million people, the precise population of Somaliland is still unknown as pastoral families move in and out and Somaliland only Somali peaceful country open border of Horn Africa could reach around 5 million populations.
Historical overview
The establishment of the Somaliland Protectorate in the second half of the 19th Century, the British garrison across the Red Sea at Aden – a key naval coaling station on the sea route to India, perceiving in the Somali hinterland a potential source of fresh meat for the British entered into a series of agreements with the traditional leadership of the clans of the area. The original treaties represented no serious territorial ambitions on the part of British, but inroads by other imperial powers (namely France, Italy) endowed the British claims to Somaliland with strategic importance in the context of the “Scramble for Africa”.
In 1899, they were confronted with a vigorous uprising led by the leader of the puritanical Salihiyya order, Sayid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan (known to the British pejoratively as “the Mad Mullah”), which reminded them disconcertingly of the Mahdist revolt only years earlier in the Sudan. The Sayid’s Darawiish (Dervish) movement tied up the energies of the British in bloody and unpredictable campaigning for two decades. In 1910, at the height of the uprising, the British were obliged to retreat to their coastal outposts, leaving Somaliland’s interior in violent turmoil. The subsequent years were a period of such acute distress and scarcity that they came to be locally known as Xaarame Cune (literally: “eating the forbidden”). It is estimated that during this period as much as one third of Somaliland’s male population perished (Jardine: 1926). Following the defeat of the Dervish Movement in 1920, the British gradually initiated administrative and social service programs in Somaliland. Some roads were cleared, a few students were sent to Sudan for higher education and a number of agricultural and water initiatives were undertaken. But in the 1940s, their efforts were again interrupted – this time by the Second World War. In 1940, British forces retreated from Somaliland to
Aden, paving the way for a short-lived occupation by Italian fascist forces. In 1941, Somaliland was recaptured by the British, and remained in their hands until independence nearly two decades later. In the world-wide wave of anti-colonial sentiment that followed the Second World War, the “wind of change” was blowing as strongly in Somaliland as elsewhere in Africa, and the British undertook to prepare their protectorate for existence as an independent state. In the few years that remained to complete the task, their neglect of the territory became dismally obvious. On independence day, June 26 1960, Somaliland possessed only a handful of university graduates and a single secondary school. Not a single sealed road linked the major towns. The principal natural resource of the territory was its livestock, and an industrial base was non-existent. Nevertheless, in its newfound freedom, Somaliland greeted these challenges with optimism, even euphoria.
Pre-independence socio-economic context
One reason for Somaliland’s optimism was the relative prosperity it enjoyed in the decade prior independence. During the 1950s, the Arabian oil boom generated an unprecedented demand for Somali livestock. The central towns of Hargeysa, Berbera, and Burco became the hubs of that trade, forming a triangle that would eventually become the core of economic development in the region. During the same period, in the Hawd region, the colonial authorities (in the person of engineer Jack Laurence5) built a chain of earth dams along the Ethiopian border to collect run-off water. These manmade depressions prolonged the period nomads could graze their livestock in the Hawd, and thus changed the face of the land forever. Permanent settlements began to appear, raising surplus livestock for export to Arabia through the markets of Somaliland’s central economic hub. In the years following independence, this zone became increasingly specialized in the commercial production of livestock and related export services. The relative economic dominance of this central triangle, and its relationship with the Arabian livestock markets, has changed very little up to the present day. Eastern Somaliland (composed essentially of present day Sool and Sanaag regions) was affected relatively little by the livestock export boom. Nomadic pastoralism has historically been the predominant social and economic mode in eastern Somaliland, but the area has nevertheless evolved somewhat separately of the central economic zone between Hargeysa, Berbera and Burco. Sanaag region has long maintained independent, sometimes clandestine, trade ties with the Arabian countries, especially Yemen. Export of livestock and frankincense in exchange for consumer goods from the Arabian side evolved into a strong commercial and cultural relationship of central importance to Sanaag’s social and economic life. Further south, the inhabitants of Sool region long ago developed a niche as an economic and social gateway between Somaliland and Somalia – a role the region still plays. Western Somaliland, comprising present day Awdal and western Woqooyi Galbeed regions, also embarked on a course of slightly separate development. Around the turn of the century, inhabitants of the area began to borrow ox-plough farming techniques from neighbouring Oromo groups (in Ethiopia) and have since developed an agropastoral mode of production in which cattle raised in sedentary agricultural villages have replaced camels as the principal stock. The region has since become increasingly specialized in the production of cereal crops – chiefly sorghum and maize – which are traded throughout Somaliland. More recently, cereal production has been supplemented by fruits and vegetables grown on small scale irrigated farms for domestic consumption. The sedentary agricultural mode of production in the west created a concentration of settlements unmatched elsewhere in Somaliland, including Gabiley, Tog Wajaale, Dila and Boorame. Furthermore, this zone came to serve increasingly as a transhipment point in the trade linking Djibouti, Jigjiga and Dire Dawa to the major population centres of Somaliland. Despite the region’s “separate development”, western Somaliland’s relative prosperity, the metropolitan influences from neighbouring towns, and the settled nature of the population have encouraged its gradual integration within Somaliland’s broader economic and political context.
The growing importance of central Somaliland over the past century has been matched by the gradual decline of the coastal areas. The importance of ancient settlements like Seylac, Bullaxaar, Xiis, Maydh, Laas Qoray and Ceelaayo was diminished when the British colonial authorities shifted their administrative centres from the uncomfortable coastal climate to the cooler Oogo zone, and was further eclipsed by the development of major ports at Berbera and Djibouti. Among the coastal towns, only Berbera, by virtue of its port facilities and its key role in the central “triangle” export trade, has gained in size and importance.
POLITICAL UNIFICATION AND THE PROMISE OF AID
While relative parity ensured that a national government provided adequate representation to all parties in the country, the willingness of anyone in Somaliland to support the creation of a national government is itself remarkable. From colonial exploitation in the 1800s to the tyrannical rule of the Siad Barre regime, the state has proven to be anything but a force for good in the experience of the average Somali. Yet Somaliland‟s government has broad public support, and Bradbury (2008) has argued that “[i]n many respects Somaliland is a `people‟s project‟ rather than a project of an elite.” This achievement was made possible in part thanks to the decentralization of Somaliland‟s government, but also in part by the fact Somalilanders did not have to worry about a government with a large, independent source of resources in the form of foreign aid.
For many Somalis, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empoweringthose who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population. This concern is common to all Somalis, but it is particularly acute among the Somalilanders, who suffered disproportionately under the military regime in Mogadishu. Somalilanders‟ concern about the emergence of a predatory state most clearly manifested itself in the push for decentralization in the design of the government. Many Somalilanders, particularly those beyond Hargeysa, deem decentralization to be an inescapable condition for their participation in Somaliland‟s political arrangement. Today, Somaliland has a federal government, divided into the central government, regional councils, and district councils. Independent elections are held at all levels, and some degree of fiscal decentralization is also maintained. Although customs collection was centralised in 2000, districts retain 10% of customs collections that occur within their borders and receive an additional 12.5% of pooled collections from the central government. Districts are also able to raise their own revenues by “taxing local resources, with land, animal slaughter and business tax providing the main revenue streams.”
Geographic Somaliland
Somaliland comprises the territory, boundaries and people of the former British
Somaliland Protectorate, defined by the following international instruments:
- The Anglo-French Treaty of 1888
- The Anglo-Italian Protocol of 1894
- The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897
From the shores of the Gulf of Aden, Somaliland extends southwards to the Somali National Regional State of Ethiopia, bounded by Djibouti to the west and Somalia (Puntland) to the east. Within these borders, Somaliland’s territory covers an area of 137,600 square kilometres, with a northern littoral of 850 kilometres (GOS – Somaliland in Figures, 1999). Three main topographical features locally known as the Guban, Oogo and Hawd distinguish the territory’s geography (Lewis: 1961).
The Guban (meaning “burnt”) is the narrow coastal region, which is hot and humid with temperatures exceeding 40 degrees centigrade during the summer season (Xagaa) between June and August. The terrain is relatively barren, allowing only desert-type sparse vegetation. Eastwards from the main port of Berbera stony mountains hug the coastline, while to the west, the plain widens to provide rich grazing for pastoralists during the cooler months between October and March. With the exception of Berbera, the population of the Guban’s sparse settlements tends to migrate southwards to the highlands during the torrid summer months, returning home when the climate becomes more bearable. Inland from the coast, elevation climbs rapidly as the Guban gives way to the Oogo: the cooler highland zone dominated by the Gollis mountain range, which crosses Somaliland from west to east. The Oogo zone possesses an abundant supply of underground water, which together with its agreeable climate has encouraged settlement and development.
The Oogo is home to all of Somaliland’s major towns and supports a degree of cultivation, notably between Hargeysa and Boorame in the west, and around Ceerigaabo in the east. The third topographical zone is the Hawd, which stretches across the border from Somaliland into Ethiopia. Although rich in pasture, the Hawd has virtually no permanent water sources. Historically, nomadic pastoralists grazed their herds in the Hawd during the rains, but were forced to migrate to more hospitable areas during the harsh dry season (Jiilaal) when water sources dried up. In the past half century, however, since the introduction of berkado (cemented underground water reservoirs), the Hawd has come to support permanent settlements. This has led to a steady process of desertification, decimating the rich pastures that once made the zone ideal for rearing livestock
